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This paper reexamines the relationship between financial market imperfections and 
economic instability. I present a model in which  financial accelerator effects come 
from adverse selection in credit markets. Unlike other models of the financial 
accelerator, the model I present has the potential to stabilize the economy rather than 
destabilize it. The stabilizing forces in the dynamic model are closely related to forces 
that cause overinvestment in static models. Consequently, the stabilizing properties of 
the model are not specific to adverse selection but rather are present in any 
environment in which credit market distortions cause overinvestment. When 
investment projects are equity financed, or when contracts are written optimally, the 
only equilibria that emerge are stabilizer equilibria. Thus, stabilizing outcomes are 
more robust in this model. Finally, the empirical distinction between accelerator 
equilibria and stabilizer equilibria is subtle. Many statistics used to test for financial 
accelerators are observationally equivalent in stabilizer equilibria. 
  
 
JEL No: E22, E32, E44, G14 
 
Christopher House 
University of Michigan 
Department of Economics 
238 Lorch Hall 





I thank John Leahy, Russell Cooper, Simon Gilchrist, Robert Barsky, Matthew Shapiro, 
and Jeff Miron for comments, insights and suggestions. 
 
© 2002 by Christopher L. House. All rights reserved.  
 1. Introduction
The …nancial accelerator hypothesis is that credit market distortions magnify eco-
nomic shocks. Disturbances that would be small in a world with perfect markets,
become exaggerated and prolonged due to imperfections in the credit and loan
markets. In other words, credit market distortions destabilize the economy. The
…nancial accelerator is an important idea because standard business cycle models
require large and persistent disturbances to mimic the business cycles we observe
in the data. Without large shocks, these models would generate business cycles
that were small and short lived. The …nancial accelerator ampli…es and propa-
gates shocks and, therefore, can potentially explain why business cycles are so
signi…cant even though the shocks we observe are relatively small.
This paper reexamines the relationship between credit market imperfections
and economic instability. I present a model in which adverse selection distorts the
loan markets. I embed the adverse selection problem in a dynamic equilibrium
model of business cycle ‡uctuations. The paper has three central messages. First,
although there are cases in which these distortions are destabilizing, there are
other cases in which the distortions cause the economy to be excessively stable.
The stabilizing outcomes in the dynamic model are closely related to overinvest-
ment outcomes in static models of credit market failure. Second, if investments
are equity …nanced or if borrowers and lenders write optimal contracts, the only
equilibria that emerge arethe stabilizerequilibria. Finally, in the adverse selection
model, the empirical distinction between accelerators and stabilizers is subtle. I
show that many of the standard statistics used to detect …nancial accelerators are
also consistent with stabilizer equilibria.
One important contribution ofthis paper is that it decomposes the total ampli-
…cation caused by the credit market distortion into separate channels. Moreover,
each channel, or e¤ect, has economic meaning. This decomposition clari…es the
way that credit market distortions amplify shocks.
Speci…cally, in the adverse selection model, a shock that increases entrepre-
neurs’ net worth has three separate e¤ects on investment. First, the increase
in internal funds causes the premium on borrowed funds to fall. With a lower
premium, investors have a greater incentive to invest. This is the “agency cost”
channel that is emphasized in much of the existing literature.
Second, since borrowers internalize more of the costs and bene…ts of their
projects when their net worth is higher, the level of investment is closer to the
e¢cient level. In some settings this causes investment to increase; in others in-vestment may fall. This second e¤ect is the dynamic counterpart of over- or
underinvestment in static adverse selection models. If there is underinvestment in
the static environment, investment will rise when internal funds increase. In the
dynamic model, this will cause shocks to be ampli…ed. If there is overinvestment
in the static environment, investment falls when internal funds increase. Con-
sequently, in the associated dynamic model, the …nancial market imperfections
mitigate shocks.
Finally, theallocationofinvestmentbecomes moree¢cientwheninternal funds
rise. Investment increases for projects with high expected returns and falls for
projects with low expected returns. So, even if the total volume of investment
does not change, shocks will be ampli…ed because investment is allocated more
appropriately.
The total e¤ect on investment is the sum of these three e¤ects. I show that
it is possible for the second e¤ect to be negative and to dominate the other two.
In such cases, the adverse selection problem ine¢ciently stabilizes the economy.
This duality betweenstabilization indynamicmodels, and overinvestment in static
models, has not been pointed out by the existing literature.
I show that accelerator equilibria are not robust to other forms of …nanc-
ing. Speci…cally, when I allow for either equity …nance or for optimal contracting
by borrowers and lenders, the only equilibria that occur are stabilizer equilibria.
Furthermore, the stabilizer equilibria do not have any overtly counterfactual im-
plications (such as a procyclical interest rate spread). The empirical distinction
between stabilizers and accelerators, in this model, is subtle. Many well known
empirical …ndings that have been cited as evidence for a …nancial accelerator are
consistent with the stabilizer equilibria in this model. This suggests that stabiliz-
ing outcomes are not mere curiosities.
Understanding the dynamic adverse selection model is easiest if we …rst ex-
amine two static adverse selection environments. These static models are the
building blocks for the dynamic model that is analyzed later.
2. Static Models of Adverse Selection in Credit Markets
In general, credit market imperfections can result in either overinvestment or
underinvestment. In the adverse selection model, over- or underinvestment is
determined by the distribution of investment opportunities. The basic intuition
can be seen by comparing two polar cases: the Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] model
(hereafter ‘SW’) and the De Meza and Webb [1987] model (hereafter ‘DW’). This
2section contains a brief analysis of these models since the behavior of these simple
static models will provide important insights into the behavior of the dynamic
model analyzed later.
2.1. Basic Setup
I start by describing the features of the models that are common to both SW and
DW. Consider a two period world in which entrepreneurs interact with savers.
Normalize the number of entrepreneurs to be 1 and assume that savers supply
S > 1 inelastically. The savers have a safe outside option that yields a gross rate
of return of ¹ ½ > 0. Competition ensures that the rate of return in the credit
market will also be ¹ ½. Let R be the rate of interest charged to the entrepreneurs:
The only di¤erence between ¹ ½ and R is default risk, ¢; thus, ¢ is the interest
rate spread, ¹ ½ = R[1¡ ¢]. I will refer to ¹ ½ as the “safe” interest rate and R as
the “risky” interest rate.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and care only about consumption in the second
period. Each entrepreneur has a project which either succeeds or fails. There are
threenumbers associated witheach project; the probability of success p, thepayo¤
in the event of success x, and the expected payo¤ r = px. The distribution of
projects can be described by a joint distribution f over any two of these numbers
since the third is redundant.
Activating a project requires an investment of one unit in the …rst period.
Entrepreneurs have personal, “internal” funds of w. Assume that w < 1 so that
they cannot self-…nance. Ifthe entrepreneurs want toactivate a project, they have
to borrow 1¡ w (“external” funds) in the credit market.
Importantly, entrepreneurs know the characteristics of their projects while
savers do not; this is the source of asymmetric information in the model. In
addition, borrowers have limited liability. If a project fails, the lenders cannot
extract further payments from the entrepreneur. For the time being, I assumethat
all credit market interactions are described by standard debt contracts. Optimal
contracting is discussed later.
Note that as the risky interest rate (R) changes, the pool of borrowers changes.
An increase in R will discourage some entrepreneurs from investing. It could
be the case that relatively more safe borrowers leave the loan pool so that ¢
increases as R increases. If more risky borrowers leave, then ¢ will fall as R rises.
Writing ¢(R) as a function of R allows explicitly for this e¤ect. In equilibrium
¹ ½ = ½(R) ´ R[1 ¡¢(R)]. One can view ¢(R) as a function that captures
3the important features of the adverse selection problem. As a technical matter,
the derivative of ½(R) will be positive in any equilibrium. Let ½0 denote this
derivative.1
The equilibrium will depend critically on the distribution of projects. It is
along this dimension that SW and DW di¤er.
2.2. Stiglitz and Weiss go to the bank
In Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], all of the projects have the same expected return r
but di¤er in their success probability p. The expected return to an entrepreneur
to activating their project is r ¡ pR(1 ¡ w). This is decreasing in p; so payo¤s
are higher if the agent has a riskier project. Thus, there is a cuto¤ probability; ^ p;
such that all agents with p < ^ p choose to apply for credit. If there is anyone at
all in the loan pool, it is the “risky tail” of the distribution. See …gure 1.A.
Since the entrepreneurs have the option to save w at the safe rate ¹ ½, the cuto¤
probability, ^ p; solves w¹ ½ = r ¡ ^ pR(1¡ w). In equilibrium





Typically, there is underinvestment in the SW model.2 The reason for the
underinvestment is simple. Consider the entrepreneur at the cuto¤ ^ p. This is
the safest project in the pool. If you could identify this entrepreneur, you would
o¤er him a low interest rate since it is relatively unlikely that he will default.
Unfortunately, this project is lost among the other riskier projects and gets an
interest rate that is appropriate for the average riskiness of the loan pool. Thus
the marginal entrepreneur’s incentive to invest is too low.
Notice that investment rises as the level of internal funds increases. For any
givenR; thecuto¤probability, ^ p; is increasing inw. Since totalinvestment consists
of all entrepreneurs with p < ^ p; investment increases with w.
1There will never be credit rationing in this economy. The safe saving option pins down the
rate of return in the credit market and e¤ectively rules out rationing. For a formal proof of this
and that ½0 > 0 in equilibrium, see House [2000]. As in Mankiw [1986], it is possible for the
credit market to be completely shut down. I restrict my analysis to equilibria in which this is
not the case.
2If r < ¹ ½ then it is optimal to have no investment and this will be the case. If ^ p > 0 then
¹ ½ · ^ pR implies ¹ ½(1 ¡ w) · r ¡ w¹ ½ ) ¹ ½ · r which contradicts ¹ ½ > r. If r > ¹ ½ then let
¹p =
R 1
0 pf(p)dp and r¤ = ¹ ½ +(1¡ w)¹ ½
1¡¹p
¹p . If r > r¤ then ^ p = 1 and all projects are activated
(which is optimal since r > ¹ ½. If ¹ ½ < r < r¤ then 0 < ^ p < 1 and there is underinvestment.
4The main points about the SW model are summarized below:
In the SW economies, the equilibria involve underinvestment. Only the
riskiest projects are undertaken. Furthermore, increases in internal
…nancing increase investment.
2.3. De Meza and Webb go to the bank
At the other extreme is the distribution considered by De Meza and Webb [1987].
Here, all projects have the same actual outcome x if they succeed. As in the SW
model, projects di¤er in their probability of success p. The expected payo¤ to
an entrepreneur who activates his project is p[x¡ R(1¡ w)] which is increasing
in p. Again there will be a cuto¤ ^ p but now the projects that activate are those
with p ¸ ^ p so that we get the “safe tail”. See …gure 1.B. The cuto¤ satis…es
^ p[x¡ R(1 ¡ w)] = w¹ ½: In this case,




It is easy to show that ¹ ½ ¸ ^ px so that the expected return on the marginal project
is below its social opportunity cost. Thus, in DW, there is overinvestment. This
intuition is similar; the marginal project is the riskiest project and “deserves” a
high interest rate. This entrepreneur is hiding among the other safer projects and
thus gets an unreasonably lowinterest rate. Consequently, the incentives to invest
for the projects at the margin are too high.
Unlike the SW model, increases in internal funds cause reductions in invest-
ment. Again, ^ p is increasing in w but since investment consists of all entrepreneurs
with p > ^ p; investment falls as w rises.
In the DW economies, equilibria involve overinvestment. Selection is
toward the safer projects and increases in internal funds reduce invest-
ment.
2.4. General Distributions
General distributions have mixed results. Nevertheless, it is useful to ask how to
distinguish underinvestment equilibria from overinvestment equilibria.
5Consider any joint density function f(r;p). For any p de…ne ^ r(p) as:
^ r(p) = ¹ ½+ (1¡ w)[pR¡ ¹ ½] (2.1)
This is the cuto¤ expected return for projects that are successful with probability
p given the interest rate R. Any entrepreneur with a project (r;p) for which
r ¸ ^ r(p) will …nd it pro…table to invest. In equilibrium, the diversi…ed rate of
return in the credit market must be equal to the safe rate of return.













= R[1 ¡¢(R;¹ ½;w)]
¢ depends on R;¹ ½, and w since the cuto¤s ^ r(p) depend on those variables.
Consider the change in output caused by increasing investment by a small
amount dI > 0. The opportunity cost of activating a project is ¹ ½. At the margin,
the expected payo¤ of a project is ^ r(p). The change in output is then
·Z 1
0
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@½ = w 8p. Conse-
quently, the sign of @¢
@½ distinguishes overinvestment models from underinvestment
ones.3 If @¢
@½ > 0 investment should be increasedwhile if @¢
@½ < 0 investment should
be restrained.
Increases in ¹ ½ discourage investment. In SW, the marginal investors have the
safest projects so an increase in ¹ ½ increases the default rate by “chasing away” the
3Mankiw [1986] derives a similar e¢ciency condition.
6safe projects. In DW, the marginal projects are the riskiest ones so increasing ¹ ½
lowers the default rate.
In general, any change in investment improves welfare only if the loan pool
becomes safer. It is easy to show that @¢
@w < 0 for any distribution. Increasing
internal funds always makes the pool safer and therefore necessarily improves
e¢ciency. If internal funds increased to the point where entrepreneurs could self-
…nance, the equilibrium cuto¤s would be ^ r(p) = ¹ ½ and the market would be
e¢cient.
3. Adverse Selection and Credit Markets Dynamics
This section presents a dynamic model of credit market failure. One of the nice
features of the model is that it permits a decomposition of the dynamic e¤ects
of the adverse selection problem into components that have economic meaning.
Speci…cally, an increase in internal funds has three separate e¤ects on dynamics.
More internal funds reduces the interest premium, which stimulates investment;
it causes more e¢cient use of investment and, more internal funds causes the level
of investment to move towards the e¢cient level.
3.1. Setup
The economy consists of overlapping generations of two period lived agents. Each
generation has savers and entrepreneurs. The number of entrepreneurs is normal-
ized to 1.
As before, entrepreneurs are risk neutral and only value consumption in the
second period of life. The entrepreneurs invest in projects that, if successful, yield
productive capital in the following period. Capital fully depreciates after use, so
the payo¤ to having one unit of capital is just its marginal product. The project
distribution is described by f(p;k), where k is the expected capital payo¤ and p
is the probability of success. Each project requires an initial investment of one
unit of the consumption good. Entrepreneurs supply one unit of labor in youth
and receive wages wt. Entrepreneurs are the only agents who supply labor.
All agents have access to a safe investment technology that yields ¹ ½ goods in
period t + 1. Note that the safe savings technology does not produce capital.
Rather it simply yields units of consumable output the period after the saving
took place. This implies that the entire capital stock comes from the market
with the adverse selection problem. In a model with additional capital markets
7that are free of distortions, one would expect a signi…cant amount of substitution
between the two markets which would partially o¤set the dynamic e¤ects of the
credit market frictions.
Entrepreneurs can either save their income (wt) to get wt¹ ½ or they can borrow
1 ¡ wt and …nance their project. I restrict attention to equilibria in which w is
strictly less than 1 so that entrepreneurs cannot self …nance.
Consider a group of projects with the same probability of success, p (a cross




[¹ ½ + (1¡ wt)fpRt ¡ ¹ ½g] (3.1)
where rt+1 is the marginal product of capital in the next period. This is the
dynamic version of equation (2.1) in the general static model. As before, there
are di¤erent cuto¤s for each p 2 [0;1]. All entrepreneurs with projects (k;p) with
k > ^ k(p) demand funding. The e¢cient cuto¤s are ^ k =
¹ ½
r for all p but these are
not the equilibrium cuto¤s. The critical values di¤er from the e¢cient cuto¤s by
an amount that is proportional to the amount of external …nancing. As internal
funds increase, the cuto¤s “move towards” the e¢cient cuto¤s. Projects that are
pulling the average payo¤ up (i.e. for which pRt > ¹ ½) set a cuto¤ that is too high.
Projects that have expected returns that are less than the average return ¹ ½ have
cuto¤s that are too low. Projects for which p = (1 ¡ ¢) are the only ones for
which ^ k =
¹ ½
r.
Consider again a cross-section of the distribution f for a given p. All projects
for which k > ^ k(p) are activated. By the lawof large numbers the contribution to
the capital stock next period from this slice of the distribution is
R1
^ k(p)kf(k;p)dk.













where zt is productivity at date t. Factor demands satisfy:





8Finally, the no-arbitrage condition is:

















are the total investment (I) and the total measure of successful projects (A)
respectively.
I assume the existence of a steady state equilibrium characterized by the con-
stant values K;w;r;A;I;¢:4
3.2. Dynamics
To generate dynamics in the model, assume that the economy is subjected to
shocks to the technology parameter z and that this process follows an AR(1)
process:
zt = (1¡ q)z + qzt¡1 + vt
where q is the autoregressive root and vt is i.i.d.
To analyzethedynamic behavior ofthemodel, Itakelog-linear approximations





















where ‘~ x’ denotes the percent deviation of the variable x from its steady state




@w ~ wt +r
@¢
@r ~ rt+1
1 ¡ ¢¡ @¢
@RR
(3.4)
4Existence is not guaranteed. Given K we have w;r; and ¢(R;w;r) that are continuous in
K but the equilibrium interest rate R is the minimum R such that ¹ ½ = R[1¡ ¢(¢)]. In general,
this R will not be continuous in K. In addition, it is possible that the mapping K ! K0 has
downward jumps; thus existence arguments using continuity or monotonicity do not work.
9The denominator isthe derivative ofR[1 ¡ ¢(¢)] withrespectto R whichis simply
½0 and in equilibrium must be positive. Finally:
~ wt = ~ zt + ® ~ Kt (3.5)
~ rt = ~ zt +(® ¡ 1) ~ Kt (3.6)
~ zt = q~ zt¡1 + vt (3.7)
The equations: (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7), characterize the local dynamics
of the system.
Appendix A.1. shows that this system can be reduced to the following ex-



































































Here "IR < 0 is the interest elasticity of investment demand. In the static models,
the function ¢(¢) described the relevant adverse selection e¤ects in the environ-
ment. Not surprisingly, the dynamic system is also governed by the …rst order
properties of this function.
Equation (3.8) describes the dynamic evolution of the capital stock. The …rst
term in the equation is the normal change in investment that occurs under full
information. The other terms represent deviations from the full information path
caused by the adverse selection problem.
The additional termsare groupedaccording towhethertheyresultfromchanges
in internal funds ( ~ wt) or changes in the expected future marginal product of cap-
ital (~ rt+1). Because …nancial accelerator theories emphasize changes in internal
5To complete the solution to the model one would substitute for ~ wt and ~ rt+1using (3.5) and
(3.6). This would reduce the system to two equations in the state variables ~ Kt and ~ zt:
10funds, I focus on the terms that interact with ~ wt and only brie‡y discuss the e¤ects
of changes in ~ rt+1.
The second term in equation (3.8) is the Agency Cost E¤ect. As cash ‡ow
increases, the pool becomes safer and the premium on external …nance falls. The
lower interestrates stimulateinvestment whichampli…es theshock. The signofthe
coe¢cientispositivesinceforany distribution, @¢
@w isnegative(increases in internal
fundsalways make thepool safer) as is theinterest elasticity ofinvestment, "IR. As
a result, this channel always serves to amplify disturbances. This term captures
the e¤ect emphasized by Bernanke and Gertler [1989].6 The magnitude of the
agency cost e¤ect depends on the absolute values of @¢
@w and "IR. If investment is
very sensitive to interest rate changes and if the interest rate is very sensitive to
changes in internal funds then the agency cost e¤ect will contribute signi…cantly
to dynamics.
The third term in equation (3.8) represents the direct a¤ect of additional
internal funds oninvestment evenifthe interestrate (R) stays the same. I call this
theInvestment E¤ect sinceitis thedynamicanalogofthee¤ect thatinternal funds
had on investment in the static model. The sign of this e¤ect is the same as the
sign of
@¢
@½. This is the same moment that di¤erentiated overinvestment settings
from underinvestment settings in the static models. Distributions that give rise to
underinvestment in equilibrium will have @¢
@½ > 0. If there is overinvestment in a
static model (like DW) then
@¢
@½ < 0: For models like the SW model, this channel
will impartadditional accelerator dynamics tothe system. Inenvironments similar
to DW, this e¤ect will cause entrepreneurs to reduce investment and will have a
stabilizing e¤ect on the economy.
I call the fourth terman E¢ciency Gain. Like the agency cost e¤ect, this e¤ect
depends on @¢
@w. Since @¢
@w is always negative, this e¤ect will be positive and will
amplify shocks. Intuitively, even if there is no change in the level of investment,
there is a bene…cial change in the composition of investment. More precisely, @¢
@w
quanti…es the increase in e¢ciency that comes from an increase in internal funds
(see Appendix A.2).
The last term, thePayo¤ E¤ect, represents the adverseselectione¤ects coming
from expected changes in the future payo¤ tocapital (the future marginal product




@½ . Like changes
6The decline in the premium is due to di¤erent reasons however. In Bernanke and Gertler
[1989], the premium falls because it is less likely for the bank to monitor so average monitoring
costs fall. In the adverse selection model, the premium falls because risky …rms leave the loan
pool while safe ones enter.
11in w; changes in r a¤ect dynamicsbycausingchangesininvestmentandby altering
the composition of investment. Looking at the coe¢cient on ~ rt+1; the reader can
see that for every term that interacts with ~ wt; there is an associated interaction
with ~ rt+1.
The total e¤ect on the system is the sum of these components. Previous
models emphasized the agency cost channel which is always positive. In the
adverse selection model, it is immediately apparent that the other components in
equation (3.8) may work to further magnify a shock (as in a SW case) or may
work to dampen the e¤ect of a shock (as in a DW case). It is possible to have
a stabilizing e¤ect that is so strong that the overall adverse selection e¤ect from
a positive productivity shock is negative. One example of such a case would be
when f (k;p) corresponds to a pure DW distribution (i.e. all of the projects have
the same actual payo¤ x when they succeed).7 This implies that the impulse
response function for the capital stock (and for output) is below that of the full
information economy.
It should be pointed out that there is no reason to believe, a priori, that, in
reality, the agency cost e¤ect is larger than the investment e¤ect and the e¢ciency
gain. In fact, since empirical estimates of "IR are typically low, the agency cost
e¤ect may not be very strong in reality. If this is the case, one should expect
the other channels to be at least as important in shaping the economy’s actual
response to a shock.
It is important to emphasize that the possibility of a …nancial stabilizer is
general and does not depend on adverse selection per se. Only two conditions
are required for stabilization. First, market imperfections must be able to cause
overinvestment. Second, the behavior of the entrepreneurs must “improve” when
their net worth rises. Many models with rational agents have this secondproperty.
When agents internalize more of the costs and bene…ts of their decisions, their
actions are more e¢cient. The …rst property (overinvestment), is also not uncom-
mon. Existing …nancial accelerator models have the second property but not the
…rst (costly-state-veri…cation always causes underinvestment). As a result, these
models always amplify shocks.8
7Intuitively, in DW economies, the only way for the agency cost erfect and e¢ciency gain to
have the right sign, is if the equilibrium volume of investment falls when internal funds rise. It
is not di¢cult to verify this mathematically, a proof is available from the author by request.
8Jensen [1986] and Malmendier and Tate [2001] present models that have the …rst property
but not the second. In these cases, …rms behave worse when internal funds rise. In Jensen
[1986], this is because managers incentives di¤er from the …rm’s incentives. In Malmendier and
Tate [2001], managers are irrationally “overcon…dent”.
123.2.1. Simulations.
For numerical simulations, one needs to specify the precise form of the distribu-
tion. To allow for some ‡exibility in distributional choice, assume that (p;k) is










Although this is restrictive, it does allow for a considerable degree of ‡exibility in
the distribution and is not too hard to work with.
The remaining parameters are ¹ ½ = 1:01; q = :95 and ® = :35. Although these
are standard values used in RBC models, the model here is much too stylized
to a¤ord a direct comparison with actual data. The details of the numerical
simulations are contained in Appendix B.
The …rst example considers an underinvestment case similar to the SW model.
The …rst order components of the function ¢ are given in the following table
together with the …rst order terms in the subsequent simulation:








“SW” Model :240 :122 ¡:075 ¡1:152 ¡1:01
“DW” Model ¡:335 :002 ¡:507 1:035 ¡:372
Table 1
The equilibrium response of the capital stock to a 1% improvement in technol-
ogy is shown in …gure 2, along with the response that would occur under perfect
information. The equilibrium response of capital is much greater than the perfect
information response. This is because all of the ampli…cation forces are pushing
in the same direction. The bottom two panels in …gure 2. show the responses of
the interest rate and investment. Investment increases by roughly 1% in response
to the 1% improvement in productivity. Only some of this is due to the agency
cost e¤ect. Since the interest elasticity of investment demand is -1 (see the table
above) and the loan rate R falls by roughly .23%, the agency cost e¤ect causes
total investment to rise by at most .23%. In fact it is less than this since the
equilibrium fall in interest rates is only partially due to increased internal funds.9
9Since this is a “SW” example, the projects at the cuto¤s are safer than the average project
in the pool. Thus, even under perfect information, default rates fall as investment rises.
13Figure 3 decomposes the total equilibrium e¤ect on the capital stock into its
various components. To …nd each piece, I use the equilibrium realizations of prices
fRt;wt;rtg8t and solve for the total amount of accumulationthat comes from each
part of equation (3.8) separately. The total response of the capital stock is the
sum of these components. The agency cost e¤ect in this example is signi…cant.
It causes the capital stock to rise by roughly .12% more than it would if the loan
markets functionede¢ciently. The largest ampli…cation channel in this example is
the “investment e¤ect”. This channel accounts for almost half of the equilibrium
change in investment.10 11
Figure 4 shows the equilibrium responses to the same 1% technology shock
when there is overinvestment. Theequilibrium response of the system is belowthe
responseintheperfectinformationenvironment. This is dueto theoverinvestment
in the steady state (note that @¢
@½ is negative in Table 1). As their internal funds
rise, managers and entrepreneurs think more carefully about which projects to
activate. Since they were overinvesting in the steady state, they actually reduce
investment as their cash ‡ow rises.
Figure 5 decomposes the aggregate e¤ect into its components. Stabilization in
this example comes from both the negative payo¤ e¤ect as well as the “investment
e¤ect”. The “investment e¤ect” causes capital to fall by .6% while the “payo¤
e¤ect” reduces capital by .18%.12
It is worth pointing out that the interest rate on risky loans (R) falls in both
cases. Increases in internal funds always reduces risk in the loan pool and conse-
quently, always drives interest rates down. Thus the correlation between changes
in output with changes in interest rate spreads and default risk cannot be used
as evidence of either stabilizers or accelerators since both theories are consistent
with this feature of the data.
10This is not a general result. In other cases (cases in which "IR is large) the “agency cost
e¤ect” can dominate the other e¤ects.
11The alert reader will notice that the perfect information response in …gure 3 di¤ers from
the perfect information response in the upper panel of …gure 2. The discrepancy is due to the
fact that I am using the “adverse selection” price path fR;w;rg in …gure 3 while in …gure 2 I
generate the actual equilibrium path under perfect information.
12In stabilizer cases it is common to have a negative “payo¤ e¤ect”. When the marginal
product of capital (r) rises, investment should increase. Because the marginal projects are
riskier than the average projects, the in‡ow of risky projects causes the default rate to rise
which raises R and curtails investment. Recalling that “overinvestment” implies that
@¢
@½ < 0;
the reader can verify that every term in the “payo¤ e¤ect” in (3.8) is negative.
143.3. Equity Financing and Optimal Contracting
One objection to the model above is that the contracts are restricted to standard
debt contracts. This subsection analyzes the equity …nancing as well as the op-
timal contracting problem. Allowing agents to issue equity or to write optimal
contracts with their lenders will change the equilibrium dynamics of the system.
3.3.1. Equity
Suppose that entrepreneurs …nance their projects with equity rather than debt.
Let ¼t be the price for a share of a project. The agent needs to raise 1 ¡ wt
external funds to …nance the project so he must sell ³t = 1¡wt
¼ shares. The payo¤
to investing for any entrepreneur is rt+1k[1 ¡ ³t] so for any project (k;p) all that
matters for an investor is k. This payo¤ is clearly increasing in k so any k > ^ k








(note that the term in brackets must be positive otherwise no entrepreneur will
invest). The e¢cient cuto¤s are
¹ ½
rt+1 and require ¼t = 1







where »(k) and ¥(k) are, respectively, the marginal density of k and the cu-
mulative marginal distribution of k associated with the joint density f (k;p);
»(k) =
R 1













Using the de…nition of ^ k:
¹ ½[¼t ¡ (1¡ wt)] > wt¹ ½
which implies that ¼t > 1 and ^ k <
¹ ½
rt+1 (there is overinvestment).
15Note that the marginal project (^ k) is the least productive project. Because
the price of equity re‡ects the average return on investment, the marginal …rm is
able to raise funds to too easily. ^ k is increasing in w so as internal funds increase,
investment contracts (given rt+1; and ¼t). Thus in the simple equity model, there
is overinvestment in the steady state and the adverse selection problem stabilizes
the economy.
3.3.2. Optimal Contracts
Neither equity nor standarddebt contracts are optimal inthis model. This section
analyzes the optimal contracting problem. Speci…cally, I consider an environment
in which banks write contracts to screen potential borrowers. Two things are
immediately apparent about the form of an optimal contract. First, since project
outcomes are observable, an optimal contract will make interest payments con-
ditional on the ex post realization of the project (x). Instead of repaying R if a
project succeeds, the borrower will repay R(x).
Second, the lenders may also attempt to screen borrowers ex ante by o¤ering
a menu of contracts fR(x);cg where c is the entrepreneurs contribution to the
funding of their own project. Intuitively, the adverse selection problem will be
less severe if the borrower contributes more of their own funds to the project.
Since entrepreneurs only have w; we require c · w for every active contract.
Banks are competitive. In equilibrium, every active contract will earn the rate
of return ¹ ½ per unit lent.
Appendix C shows that the optimal contract is given by fR(x);wg for every x.
The lenders conditionthe interestpayment on theproject outcomeandrequirethe
entrepreneurs to contribute all of their internal funds to the project. Projects in
outcome group x all get standard debt contracts with a common interest payment
R(x). Thus, the optimal contract has both debt and equity features.
This implies that for any distribution f(x
p;p), the markets e¤ectively separate
the distribution into a set of distinct markets ffx(p)g8x where each univariate
distribution fx(p) is a “slice” of f(
x
p;p). Thus, optimal contracting breaks the
original adverse selection problem (with distribution f(x
p;p)) into a set of De
Meza-Webb economies each with distribution fx(p). Furthermore, we already
know that the DW economies are stabilizers in the dynamic environment.
163.3.3. Discussion
The results of the optimal contracting problem and the model with equity …nance
are summarized below:
If the projects are equity …nanced or if borrowers and lenders write
optimal contracts, then for any distribution of projects f, the only
equilibria are stabilizers.
Said another way, both equity …nancing and optimal contracting eliminate all
of the accelerator equilibria. Every equilibrium is a stabilizer. This implies that,
to a certain extent, the stabilizer equilibria are more robust than the accelerator
equilibria.13
In reality, many small business loans are characterized by contracts that have
both debt and equity features.14 If the business “fails” the lenders are still the
residual claimants. If the business “succeeds” then the …nanciers are paid an
amount that increases with the degree of success. These contracts are similar to
the optimal contracts in this model. The contracts here di¤er from equity because
payo¤s may be non-increasing in the outcome x. If the default rate for one group
(x) is lower than another (x0), then R(x) < R(x0) even if x0 > x.
In addition to the screening contracts considered here, one could consider a
signaling game in which entrepreneurs choose their collateral and then the …rms
o¤er interest rates R(x) once they have observed the collateral. This setup, in
which the more informed parties choose the collateral, will also eliminate the
accelerator equilibria.15
4. Evidence
Since credit market imperfections may stabilize rather than amplify shocks, it is
worth considering if data can conclusively di¤erentiate the two cases. This section
13Bernanke and Gertler [1990] considered a contracting problem in a model with both adverse
selection and moral hazard (in the form of unobserved e¤ort). In that model, the accelerator
e¤ects coming from the moral hazard problem overpowered the stabilizing e¤ects coming from
the adverse selection problem.
14I thank Robert Hall for bringing this to my attention.
15See Spence [1973], [1974]. Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] give the original formulation and
analysis of screening problems like the one considered in this paper. See also the discussion in
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [1995], chapter 13.
17reviews some of the empirical work on the …nancial accelerator and relates it to
the adverse selection model.
4.1. Interest Rate Spreads
Figure 4 plots the interest rate spread between BAA rated bonds and 10 year
treasury bills verses detrended industrial production. The spread is clearly coun-
tercyclical. There are many possible explanations for this pattern. When business
conditions are unfavorable, it is more likely for …rms to go bankrupt. As a result,
loans made during a recession will come with a higher risk premium. In addition,
in recessions, internal funds are lower. This exacerbates agency costs, adverse
selection problems and moral hazard problems associated with lending and thus
also requires a higher premium.
Some researchers argue that the countercyclicality of the spread may be in-
dicative of a …nancial propagation mechanism.16
In the adverse selection model, the correlation between the spread and eco-
nomic activity is not useful in determining whether there is a …nancial accelerator.
This is true even when the changes in the spread are due entirely to changes in
market distortions. When internal funds increase, the loan pool always becomes
safer. Thus, even though the model can stabilize shocks, the default rate, and
consequently the spread, always moves in the right direction.
4.2. Access to Bond Markets
Gertler and Gilchrist [1994] compare the behavior of small …rms to large …rms.
They argue that small …rms are more dependent on bank loans than larger …rms
which have access to bond markets. This suggests that small …rms face signi…-
cant market distortions while large …rms have to overcome smaller informational
hurdles. The authors …nd that sales for small …rms are much more volatile than
for large …rms. They conclude that …nancial accelerator e¤ects are quantitatively
signi…cant.
There would be reasons to question this result if the data were generated by
an adverse selection model. To reach their conclusion, Gertler and Gilchrist [1994]
16See Gertler, Hubbard, and Kashyap [1991]. More recently, Bacchetta and Caminal [2000]
argue that the cyclicality of the external…nance premium is su¢cient totell whether the …nancial
markets are accelerating or stabilizing. In his comments on Fuerst’s [1995] paper, Gertler [1995]
suggested that if the spread moved in the right direction, Fuerst’s model would exhibit a …nancial
accelerator. See also Azariadis and Shankha [1999].
18assume that the equilibrium distortions in the provision of bank loans are more
signi…cant than the distortions in the bond markets. This may or may not be true
in reality. It is possible that the bond markets are the ones with the market im-
perfection while the intermediated loans are not. Consider the following scenario:
Banks have a costly technology that reveals a …rms type perfectly. Informational
problems are severe for small …rms so that all of their loans are intermediated.
These problems are not severe for large …rms so they can issue bonds. In equi-
librium, small …rms get intermediated loans but behave e¢ciently while the large
…rms make decisions that are distorted. This would reverse Gertler and Gilchrist’s
conclusion.
4.3. The Flight to Quality
In recessions, the ratio of safe loans to risky loans increases. This pattern is
called the “‡ight to quality” and some researchers see it as evidence of a …nancial
accelerator.17
Again, the ‡ight to quality is potentially able to distinguish between the two
cases. But, to do so, the econometrician must know which markets are the “high
quality” ones and which ones are not. Speci…cally, he must know if funds are
‡owing from markets with relatively high informational frictions to markets with
relatively lower frictions.
If the low default rate markets are the ones with less distortion, then the ‡ight
to quality suggests an accelerator. However, it is possible that markets with high
levels of distortion in equilibrium are markets with low default rates. If the high
default rate markets have less distortion, then the distortions could be stabilizing.
4.4. Cash-Flow Sensitivity
One test that would be able to correctly discriminate between stabilizer equilibria
and accelerator equilibria is cash-‡ow sensitivity analysis. In this model, if entre-
preneurs received an exogenous increase in internal funds, one would only have to
observe how they altered their investment behavior. If they increase investment
then there is a …nancial accelerator.
An endogenous increase in cash ‡ow has two separate e¤ects on investment.
First, increases in internal funds signal that there should be more investment
17See, among others, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox [1993], Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
[1996], Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel [1995] and Lang and Nakamura [1995].
19even under perfect information. Second, there are the e¤ects of …nancial market
imperfections. Empirically, it is di¢cult to separate these two e¤ects.
Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson [1987] propose regressing a …rm’s investment
on Tobin’s Q and on cash ‡ow.18 If the coe¢cient on cash ‡ow is signi…cant then,
they argue that this suggests that there are …nancial market imperfections. Most
regressions of this type …nd positive cash ‡ow e¤ects.
Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995] …nd evidence that …rms that they identify ex
ante as …nancially constrained have high cash ‡ow sensitivities. However, among
the unconstrainedgroups they …nd that …rms that have access to the bondmarket
have a negative cash ‡ow sensitivity.
Kaplan and Zingales [1997] argue that cash ‡ow regressions cannot shed any
light on the presence of …nancial market imperfections. To support their claim
they present detailed evidence showing that …rms that were identi…ed as …nan-
cially unconstrained actually had the highest cash ‡ow sensitivities. Erickson and
Whited [2000] argue that, once one corrects for measurement error in Q, cash
‡ow does not matter in investment regressions at all. As with Gilchrist and Him-
melberg [1995], and Kaplan and Zingales [1997], Erickson and Whited also get
several negative cash-‡ow sensitivity estimates and …nd that the …rms that are
classi…ed as uncontstrained have greater cash ‡ow sensitivity than the …nancially
constrained …rms.19
Although cash ‡ow sensitivity is a direct test for …nancial accelerator e¤ects,
the results are mixed and the approach is somewhat controversial.20
4.5. Summary
The evidence pointing to the presence of a …nancial accelerator is mixed. While
the cash ‡ow sensitivity tests can, in principle, distinguish between stabilizers
and accelerators, the results of these tests are not consistent across studies. In
addition to the di¢cult task of correctly identifying exogenous shocks to cash
‡ow, researchers occasionally obtain negative cash ‡ow e¤ects in these regres-
sions. These results are often treated as aberrations. The other tests are either
observationally equivalent in the stabilizer settings or they require some special
knowledge on the part of the econometrician.
18See also Kashyap, Lamont and Stein [1994], Whited [1992], Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein,
[1991], Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited [1995], and Calomiris and Hubbard [1995].
19See also Clearly [1999].
20See Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson [2000] and Kaplan and Zingales [2000].
205. Related Literature
The term …nancial accelerator was coined by Bernanke and Gertler [1989]. In
their model, costly state veri…cation problems cause the distortions in the credit
market. In costly state veri…cation models, lenders incur costs to monitor the
behavior of their borrowers.21 Although Bernanke and Gertler emphasized that
costly state veri…cation is only one possible source of credit market failure, most
of the subsequent literature has continued to focus on this case.22
The literature on credit market frictions in dynamic settings has grown sig-
ni…cantly since the paper by Bernanke and Gertler [1989]. Fuerst [1995] was an
early attempt to quantify the …nancial accelerator. Carlstrom and Fuerst [1997]
expanded on this work by allowing the entrepreneurs in their model to be long
lived. This modi…cation (suggested by Gertler [1995]) introduced a positive auto-
correlation to output growth that is not usually foundinbusiness cyclemodels but
that does appear in the data. Although the model could generate “hump-shaped”
output dynamics, it was still incapable of causing much ampli…cation.23 Kiyotaki
and Moore [1997] and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1998] provide models with
signi…cant accelerator e¤ects. The crucial feature of these models is the role of
leverage in increasing the volatility of internal funds.
Eisfeldt [1999] considers adverse selection in the market for claims to ongoing
projects. She assumes that in expansions, idiosyncractic income becomes more
volatile. Consequently, agents sell claims to good projects more often. This
reduces the “lemons premium”, and increases investment.
21See Townsend [1979] and Gale and Hellwig [1985] for the original analysis of costly state
verri…cation model.
22Bernanke and Gertler [1990] and Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] are important departures from
the costly state veri…cation framework.
23One might argue that stabilizers have been present in some of the earlier models but this
is not really the case. In Fuerst [1995] and Carlstrom and Fuerst [1997], for some parameters
the impulse response for the constrained model is below the that of the full information model.
This is because their accelerator mechanism also introduces an adjustment cost. The telling
feature of an accelerator is how increases in internal funds a¤ect investment. In both of these
models, exogenous increases in net worth cause increases in investment. These models look like
stabilizers because the adjustment cost feature is overpowering the accelerator feature. Baccetta
and Caminal [2000] claim to have a model with a …nancial stabilizer. In their stabilizers, shocks
that cause output to expand in the full information environment are constructed to have a
negative in‡uence on internal funds. Thus, their model has only the standard accelerator e¤ect.
In all of these “arti…cial” stabilizers, the models have the conterfactual implication that the
spread moves procyclically.
21Jensen [1986] o¤ers a di¤erent rationale for “cash ‡ow sensitivity” …ndings. He
argues that …rm’s managers are tempted to invest when the …rm has cashon hand
even if the projects are not economically viable. Thus, rather than appealing to
credit market distortions, Jensen argues that principal-agent problems within the
…rm cause cash ‡ow sensitivity.
In addition to the theoretical literature their is also a large, and growing body
of empirical work on credit markets and business cycles. Good summaries are
found in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [1996] and Gertler [1988]. Kashyap,
Stein and Wilcox [1993] show that following a monetary contraction, the ratio of
commercial paper issuances to bank loans rises. More broadly, Lang and Naka-
mura [1992] show that the ratio of low risk loans to high risk loans moves coun-
tercyclically. Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel [1995] provide evidence on the
countercyclicality of commercial paper issues. They argue that this is partly to
…nance trade credit for …rms without access to bond markets.
In a recent paper, Malmendier and Tate [2001] argue that CEO’s overinvest
in their own projects. They show that many CEO’s in Fortune 500 companies
repeatedly buy stock in their own company for their personal portfolios. This
suggests that these CEO’s are too con…dent and have a tendency to overinvest.24
6. Conclusions
This paper analyzes a model in which adverse selection causes credit market dis-
tortions. These distortions have several e¤ects on the dynamic response of the
model to economic shocks. The total e¤ect of the adverse selection problem can
be broken down into components that have economic interpretations. This de-
composition provides a window into the workings of dynamic models of …nancial
market imperfections. In particular, the decomposition shows that there is a di-
rect connection between overinvestment and underinvestment instatic models and
stabilizers and accelerators in dynamic models. This possibility for ine¢cient sta-
bilization of economic shocks is not present in existing dynamic models of credit
market imperfections. In the model I consider, equity …nancing, or optimal con-
tracting between borrowers and lenders, eliminate all of the accelerator equilibria
24The combination of overinvestment and destabilization in both Jensen [1986] and in Mal-
mendier and Tate [2001], con‡icts with the results of my model (in which overinvestment implies
stabilization, not destabilization). In both of these cases, some pathological behavior on the part
of the …rm is required. Rather than behaving better when their net worth increases, …rms behave
worse.
22for any speci…cation of the model. In these cases, the stabilizer outcomes are the
only possible equilibria under such contracting.
Empirically, the evidence in favor of a …nancial accelerator is mixed. Although
suggestive, none of the statistics considered so far can be o¤ered as conclusive
evidence of a …nancial accelerator.
Financial market imperfections can cause the economy to be ine¢ciently sta-
ble. The potential for a stabilizing outcome is present in any setting with over-
investment in the steady state. The fact that it is di¢cult to distinguish the
stabilizers from the accelerators in data suggests that more care should be taken
before concluding that credit market frictions are a destabilizing feature of the
economy.
23Appendices
Appendix A.1 : Deriving Equation (3.8)



































































































































































































































































using the fact that ½0 =
h
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which is rearranged to get equation (3.8).
Appendix A.2. : The E¢ciency Gain E¤ect.

















































Since ¹ ½ = R[1 ¡ ¢] we have:
Rw [1¡ ¢]¡ R[¢w + ¢RRw] = 0





































25using the expression for @ ^ k
























Using the de…nition of ½0,
@Kt+1
@w





½0 [1 ¡ ¢]



















which is the e¢ciency gain e¤ect.
Appendix B: Numerical Simulations.
The settings for the parameters used in the quantitative model are given in the table below. Keep in









; so that ¹p is





rather than the mean of p.
Distributional parameters
Model ¹p ¹k ¾2
p ¾2
k ¾pk
SW: 4 1 1 -.1 -3
DW: 3.5 1 2.5 .2 3
To solve the model, I employ an ad hoc two dimensional quadrature procedure. Given the parameters of





is normally distributed with mean ¹p and variance
¾2
p. I divide this marginal distribution into 20 cross sections or “strips”. I take the :05 percentiles of the
distribution as the strips and assume that all the projects in a strip all have the same success probability.









and the success probability for the strip is:























The “mass” for each strip is .05 (by construction).































Conditional on the success probability p, the conditional distribution obeys:
ln k ¡ ¹kjp
¾kjp
» N(0;1)






















where © is the standard normal distribution: Then K is governed by:



















¾ where Á is the normal density).
Given R;w;r;½ one can construct ^ k(pj) from (3.1). I can then use MATLAB quadrature subroutines to
…nd the 20 I’s and the value for K as described above. Clearly w and r (and indirectly R) will all depend on
the capital stock. Thus the problem becomes …nding a …xed point in K. The solution proceeds as follows.
First guess a value for the steady state capital stock K: This will imply w and r. With these values I
perform a grid search to …nd the associated equilibrium R. Speci…cally, I pick R and form ^ k(pj) for j = 1:::20.






. The equilibrium will be the smallest R such
that ½(R) = ½ (the exogenously speci…ed safe rate of return). With this R I can construct the an associated
I0; and K 0. If K 0 = K then we have an equilibrium. If K0 6= K then I revise my initial guess for the steady
state capital stock.
With the steady state capital stock, I numerically evaluate the …rst order components of the function ¢:
¢r; ¢w; ¢R; and ¢½: This completes the solution.
27Appendix C: The Optimal Financial Contract.
Since the ex post realization of the project is costlessly observable we can assume that there are separate
menus of contracts o¤ered to each outcome group (x): Within any outcome group there are many di¤erent
projects all of which have the same x but di¤ering p’s: Let pj be an arbitrary project in such a group. I
will consider contracts of the form fR;cg where c is the amount of resources that an individual contributes
toward their own project. Clearly c · w. The payo¤, P; to an entrepreneur for accepting a contract fR;cg
and activating their project is
P(p;fR;cg) = p[x ¡ R(1¡ c)] + ¹ ½(w ¡ c)
Note that since they only “put up” c they save the remaining w ¡c and earn ¹ ½. (The payo¤ to not investing
is simply w¹ ½).
The indi¤erence curves for an individual with project pj are shown in …gure 7.A. Notice that at the
interest rate R =
½
pj the entrepreneur is indi¤erent between di¤erent values of the contribution c. At R =
½
pj
they are being charged a “fair” interest rate and as a result, they don’t care how much of the investment
comes from c and how much comes from bank loans. If R >
½
pj then they are facing an interest rate that is
“too high” and they would prefer to …nance more of the project themselves. If R is too low then they will
prefer to borrow heavily and …nance as little of the project as possible.
A competitive equilibrium is a set of contracts C ´ ffR;cgg such that for all active contracts fR;cg 2 C
we have ½(fR;cg) = ¹ ½ and for all projects pj that accept fR;cg we have P(pj;fR;cg) ¸ P(pj;fR0;c0g)
8 fR0;c0g 2 C.
Result C.1: In any equilibrium, there can only be 1 R o¤ered (and accepted) in C.
To see this, suppose that this were not the case and that there were two interest rates RH > RL (with






). Since both are active
contracts there must be some projects j applying at
©
RH;cHª
for which pj ¸ ¹ ½




) < ¹ ½). Such projects will all wish to deviate to RL.22 There will be no such deviations
in equilibrium so we conclude that there is only one equilibrium R o¤ered. Denote this equilibrium interest
rate ¹ R.
Result C.2: In any equilibrium the contribution is c = w.
If this were not the case then the equilibrium would have c1 < w in the equilibrium. One of two things
must be true: (1) there are both pj >
¹ ½
¹ R and pk ·
¹ ½
¹ R applying at c1 or (2) there is only pj =
¹ ½
¹ R applying at
c1. (Again this follows since ½(
© ¹ R;c
ª
) = ¹ ½ for all active contracts).
If there are both high and low probability projects at c1 then consider the contract in …gure 7.B. Clearly
the high types would prefer contract c2. Furthermore, a creditor o¤ering such a contract would earn economic
pro…t (i.e. ½(fR2;c2g) > ½(
© ¹ R;c1
ª
) ). This type of pro…table deviation can not be present in a competitive
equilibrium.
If there is just pj =
¹ ½
¹ R applying at c1 then either there are other pk applying at other contracts c0 or pj
is the only type in existence. Since the latter case is trivial (such an equilibrium has no selection problem
and has R =
¹ ½
pj with any c · w) I will proceed under the assumption that there exist other types pk 6= pj.
These entrepreneurs apply at contracts
©
¹ R;c0ª









Assume that c0 > c. Then it is easy to show that type pl will strictly prefer contract c and will deviate.
An analogous argument applies for c0 < c. I conclude that the only equilibrium has c = w.23
Results C.1 and C.2 imply that the optimal contract takes the form given in the text.
22It is easy to show that for any p ¸
¹ ½
R; the entrepreneur will strictly prefer any contract for which R0 < R regardless of c
(as long as 0· c · w).
23It is possible that the candidate equilibrium I have o¤ered could be broken by a bank that o¤ered multiple contracts some
of which earned pro…ts and some of which did not. If I were to allow such deviations it is possible that an equilibrium might
not exist.
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